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INTRODUCTION

Though South Carolina adopted the doctrine of common law marriage in
1832,1 the 2019 decision of Stone v. Thompson drastically altered the course
of family law jurisprudence by prospectively abolishing the institution.2 Stone
has immeasurable repercussions, and unfortunately, those who the decision
impacts directly may not comprehend the magnitude of the abolishment until
their partner passes away, their relationship splits, or tragedy strikes. Upon
these occurrences, South Carolina law no longer protects relationships that are
not solemnized by a formal marriage ceremony, regardless of whether the
relationship qualified as a marriage under the common law regime. Take, for
example, a hypothetical husband and wife named Cooper and Adeline. The
couple was married on a brisk autumn evening at the Lace House in Columbia,
South Carolina. Adeline's best friend, Rachel, applied to become a notary
public specifically to perform the ceremony. Although neither Cooper nor
Adeline were aware at the time, Rachel had not yet filed her commission. Five
years later, Adeline discovered that Cooper, a successful cardiothoracic
surgeon, was having an affair with his scrub nurse. Adeline filed for divorce
on the basis of adultery, and on a whim, Cooper decided to check the validity
of their marriage license. Regrettably for Adeline, she and Cooper were

married three months after the opinion of Stone v. Thompson.3 Because their
marriage license was not properly notarized, their marriage was procedurally

invalid. As an unemployed housewife, spoiled by the luxuries of her
husband's income, Adeline was left empty-handed after his affair. Without
the availability of common law marriage, Adeline had no income, no place to
live, and no right to equitable distribution or alimony.
In its abolishment, the Stone court first evaluated the historical
justifications for common law marriage, acknowledging the role of the
institution during colonization and then turning to state recognition of the
doctrine.4 The court conceded common law marriage was widely accepted
among states well into the 1900s yet indicated that the current trend of
abolishment signifies a new era.5 Turning toward South Carolina law, the
Stone court claimed existing ambiguities in the institution of marriage
evidenced a need for fairness and consistency: "Our quest to see inside the
minds of litigants asserting different motivations and levels of knowledge at
varying times must yield to the most reliable measurement of marital intent:

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

Fryer v. Fryer, 9 S.C. Eq. (Rich. Cas.) 85 (1832).
See 428 S.C. 79, 833 S.E.2d 266 (2019).
Id.
Id. at 83, 833 S.E.2d at 268.
Id.
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a valid marriage certificate." 6 Although this Note contends the Stone usurped
legislative power by abolishing common law marriage,] it is important to
observe that the institution's outcomes served as a basis for legitimate marital
benefits, including alimony, distribution of assets, estate distribution,
insurance benefits and spousal coverage, visitation and custody, and many
others.8
The drastic implications of Stone's prospective abolishment are
incredibly unjust, especially for couples with a genuine good faith belief in
the validity of a covertly defective marriage. Prior to Stone, such couples had
an underlying assurance that the doctrine of common law marriage ratified
any defective formal marriage. After Stone, however, these couples cannot
retroactively establish a marital relationship, which leaves them without a way
to ensure protection or receive marital benefits in the case of divorce or
tragedy. 9 While other states have adopted protections to safeguard good faith
couples, such as putative spouse doctrine and palimony, the only existing
doctrinal protection in South Carolina is the good faith exception, found in
0
Thomas v. 5 Star Transportation.1
As this Note maintains, however, the good

faith exception is severely underdeveloped and rather inadequate to address
the complexities Stone presents. In order to address the inequities of Stone in
this regard, the South Carolina Supreme Court must expound upon the good
faith exception by recognizing the doctrine's role outside of the context of
bigamy, eliminating its impediment removal requirement, and sufficiently

clarifying the definitional standard of "good faith." Ultimately, despite the
court's seemingly clear-cut holding, Stone commemorates an uncertain era in
family law jurisprudence-one that is riddled with unfair remedies and will,
in time, require the court to adopt some form of doctrinal protection for good
faith partners.
Part II of this Note describes the doctrine of common law marriage and
its history before examining the Stone court's prospective abolishment and
refined test for retroactive establishment. Part III analyzes the court's
authority to abolish common law marriage and examines the future
implications of such abolishment. Part IV describes the current rights of
cohabitants who do not qualify for common law marriage because of Stone,
6.
Id. at 86, 833 S.E.2d at 270.
7.
See infra Part III.
8.
See infra Section IV.A.
9.
Stone, 428 S.C. at 83, 833 S.E.2d at 268.
10. 412 S.C. 1, 770 S.E.2d 183, 191 (Ct. App. 2015) ("If a man and woman enter into a
contract of marriage believing in good faith that they are capable of entering into the relation
notwithstanding a former marriage, when, in fact, the marriage is still of force, and after the
removal of the obstacle of the former marriage the parties continue the relation and hold
themselves out as man and wife, such action constitutes them man and wife from the date of the
removal of the obstacle." (citing Davis v. Whitlock, 90 S.C. 233, 246, 73 S.E. 171, 175 (1911))).
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while Part V suggests three possible doctrinal approaches that ensure
equitable remedies for partners entering a marriage with mistaken belief as to
its validity. Finally, Part VI concludes by recounting the myriad effects of the
prospective abolishment and proposing the South Carolina Supreme Court
expand and adopt the "good faith exception" found in Thomas v. 5 Star
Transportation."
II.

STONE V. THOMPSON

In Stone v. Thompson, the South Carolina Supreme Court was tasked with
"determin[ing] whether the family court was correct in finding Susan
Thompson and Marion Stone were common law married in 1989, as well as

whether Stone was entitled to an award of attorney's fees."1 2 Evidently, upon
analysis of the parties' relationship, the court determined it was time for South
Carolina to "join the overwhelming national trend and abolish [the institution
of common-law marriage]. Therefore, from [July 24, 2019] forward-that is,
purely prospectively-parties may no longer enter into a valid marriage in
South Carolina without a license." 3
A.

The Doctrine of Common Law Marriage

Unlike formal marriage, common law marriage does not depend on the
existence of a marriage license.' 4 Rather, the Stone court noted: "A commonlaw marriage is formed when the parties contract to be married, either
expressly or impliedly by circumstance. The key element in discerning
whether parties are common law married is mutual assent: each party must
intend to be married to the other and understand the other's intent."' 5 Thus, a

11. Id. at 1-18, 770 S.E.2d at 183-92.
12. 428 S.C. at 82, 833 S.E.2d at 267. Although the specific facts of Stone are irrelevant
to the abolishment, a brief recitation may be helpful: Stone and Thompson began dating in the
1980s. Id. at 89-90, 833 S.E.2d at 271. At the time, Thompson was married to her ex-husband.
Id. The couple divorced in 1987, and Stone and Thompson had a child shortly thereafter. Id. In
1989, Stone and Thompson had a second child and began living together. Id The same year,
Stone alleged Thompson introduced Stone as her husband at an art gallery. Id. at 91, 833 S.E.2d
at 272. The couple lived and worked together until approximately 2009, when it was revealed
Stone was having an affair. Id. at 90-91, 833 S.E.2d at 272. The family court identified a
common law marriage beginning in 1989 according to the art gallery introduction. Id. Other than
this allegation, there was mixed evidence in the form of witness testimony, tax documents,
contracts, and banking records. Id.
13. Id. at 82, 833 S.E.2d at 267.
14. Id. at 83, 833 S.E.2d at 268.
15. Id. at 88, 833 S.E.2d at 270 (citations omitted) (citing Callen v. Callen, 365 S.C. 618,
626, 620 S.E.2d 59, 63 (2005)). "Some factors to which courts have looked to discern the parties'
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common law marriage consists of two elements: (1) an express or implied
contract to marry and (2) mutual intent to be married. More often than not, a
common law marriage is implied by direct and circumstantial evidence, such
as tax returns, living arrangements, and introductions to third-parties as
"husband" or "wife."'6

For centuries, the institution of marriage, whether formal or common law,
has been marked by "an expanding list of governmental rights, benefits, and
responsibilities." 7 These rights, benefits, and responsibilities apply at the
state and federal levels and include:
[T]axation; inheritance and property rights; rules of intestate
succession; spousal privilege in the law of evidence; hospital access;
medical decisionmaking authority; adoption rights; the rights and
benefits of survivors; birth and death certificates; professional ethics
rules; campaign finance restrictions; workers' compensation
benefits; health insurance; and child custody, support, and visitation
rules.' 8
Despite the procedural differences between formal and common law
marriages, as noted South Carolina family law professor Roy Stuckey has
written, "[t]he legal consequences of entering into a common law marriage
are no different from the legal consequences of entering into a [formal]
marriage. Marriage is marriage, and the same rights and obligations attach to

either form."1 9 Accordingly, a state's recognition of common law marriage
inherently influences a couple's right to enjoy both state and federal marital
benefits, including alimony, distribution of assets, estate distribution,
insurance benefits and spousal coverage, visitation and custody, and many
others. 20

intent include tax returns, documents filed under penalty of perjury, introductions in public,
contracts, and checking accounts." Id. (citing Kirby v. Kirby, 270 S.C. 137, 142, 241 S.E.2d
415, 417 (1978); Barker v. Baker, 330 S.C. 361, 365, 499 S.E.2d 503, 505-06 (Ct. App. 1998);
Owens v. Owens, 320 S.C. 543, 545, 466 S.E.2d 373, 375 (Ct. App. 1996); Cathcartv. Cathcart,
307 S.C. 322, 324, 414 S.E.2d 811, 812 (Ct. App. 1992)).
16. See Stone, 428 S.C. at 88, 833 S.E.2d at 270 ("Some factors to which courts have
looked to discern the parties' intent include tax returns, documents filed under penalty of pejury,
introductions in public, contracts, and checking accounts.").
17. Obergefellv. Hodges, 576 U.S. 644, 670 (2015).
18.

Id.; see also Editorial, SC Says Long-Overdue I Don't' to Troublesome Common-

Law Marriage, POST & COURIER (July 26, 2019), https://www.postandcourier.com/opinion/
editorials/editorial-sc-says-long-overdue-i-dont-to-troublesome-common-law-marriage/article_
cfc37bec-afOa-11e9-bb9b-6bical8b2143.html [https://penna.cc/HF76-NJSC].

STUCKEY,

19.

ROY T.

20.

See infra Section IV.A.
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B.

History of Common Law Marriage

The doctrine of common law marriage began in pre-Reformation Europe

as a result of mounting frustrations with the formal requirements of
marriage. 21 At the time, marriage was available solely to those members of
wealthy and noble families 22 because, as family law scholar Goran Lind
acknowledged, "[o]nly the upper class . . had the means and the possibility
of entering into ceremonial marriages."

23

Without a supporting spouse,

women outside of these social circles were rarely capable of independently
supporting themselves, much less any illegitimate children. 24 Eventually,
common law marriage developed as an available alternative, producing the
societal recognition of marriage while preserving the costs and formalities of
a traditional marriage ceremony. 25
Although the 1753 passage of Lord Hardwicke's Marriage Act 2 6 ceased

English recognition of common law marriage, the American colonists carried
their own opinions on the doctrine to the New World. 27 While some colonies
abrogated common law marriage through codification, others continued to
informally recognize common law marriage notwithstanding the English
enactment of Lord Hardwicke's Marriage Act. 28 Upon the American
Revolution, however, New York became the first state to recognize common
law marriage via judicial decision, citing three English cases as its basis for
doing so. 29

Soon after New York adopted common law marriage, the doctrine swept
the United States. States enacted legislation and developed case law,
conceding numerous justifications for its recognition. 30 Primarily, adopting

states were concerned with procedural defects that failed to satisfy the
statutory requirements of formal marriage. First, because state officers and

21. Stone, 428 S.C. at 83, 833 S.E.2d at 268; Ashley Hedgecock, Comment, Untying the
Knot: The Propriety of South Carolina'sRecognition of Common Law Marriage, 58 S.C. L.
REV. 555, 559 (2007); Editorial, supra note 18.
22. Hedgecock, supra note 21, at 559.
23. GORAN LIND, COMMON
COHABITATION 135 (2008).

LAW

MARRIAGE:

A

LEGAL

INSTITUTION

FOR

24.
25.
26.
to an end

Hedgecock, supra note 21, at 559.
Id. at 560.
As a result of the Act, "marriage was required to follow a specific procedure, putting
the very popular, and rather less formal, tradition of clandestine marriages." James
Hardy, The History ofHardwicke 'sMarriageAct of1753, HIST. COOPERATIVE (Sept. 14, 2016),
https://historycooperative.org/the-history-of-hardwickes-marriage-act-and-the-beginning-ofthe-wedding-industry/ [https://penna.cc/UN9U-VT5C].
27. Hedgecock, supra note 21, at 559.
28. Id.
29. LIND, supra note 23, at 139.
30. Id at 140-48.
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ministers were located primarily in well-populated communities, access to
authorized officiants was reduced for those in distant, rural areas. 3 1In tandem,
state governments expressed overwhelming concern for the single mothers
who depended on governmental benefits to support illegitimate and immoral
children.3 2 These converging concerns led states ultimately to view the
doctrine of common law marriage as a necessity-recognizing the burden of
harsh statutory requirements, acknowledging the risk of accidental noncompliance, and simultaneously ensuring marital benefits for those in need.33
Despite modern access to officiants and less apprehension for dependent
women and children, procedural defect is still an overwhelming concernone which the Stone court overlooked.3 4
Eventually, following the lead of New York and a wealth of other states, 35
South Carolina adopted common law marriage in the 1832 case of Fryer v.
Fryer, where the court set forth that "[o]ur law prescribes no [marriage]
ceremony. It requires nothing but the agreement of the parties, with an
intention that that agreement shall, per se, constitute the marriage."

36

Following judicial recognition of common law marriage, the South Carolina
General Assembly enacted a statute implicitly recognizing the doctrine:
"Nothing herein contained shall render any marriage illegal without the
issuance of a license." 37

Although common law marriage was widely accepted during the late
1800s and well into the 1900s, the Stone court noted that "the [modern]
prevailing trend . .. has been repudiation of the doctrine." 38 Currently, fewer

than ten states permit common law marriages. 39 As for South Carolina, the
legislature has made multiple attempts to prospectively abolish common law
marriage after a specified date, while simultaneously amending or repealing
§ 20-1-360 of the South Carolina Code to conform with the proposed

31. Hedgecock, supra note 21, at 560; see also Stone v. Thompson, 428 S.C. 79, 83, 833
S.E.2d 266, 268 (2019).
32. See Hedgecock, supra note 21, at 560 ("Most notable was the desire to protect
women, and the family unit in general, by allowing financially dependent women to look to the
family for financial support rather than to burden the towns.").
33. Id. ("[T]he physical hardships of frontier life made survival easier for married couples
than for single persons.").
34. Stone, 428 S.C. at 79-91, 833 S.E.2d at 266-72.
35. LIND, supra note 23, at 140-41.
36. 9 S.C. Eq. 85, 92 (1832).
37. S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-1-360 (2014) (originally enacted as S.C. CODE OF 1912 § 3749
(Civ. Code)).
38. Stone, 428 S.C. at 84, 833 S.E.2d at 268.
39. Id.
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abolishment. 40 However, of its ten attempts, the most successful attempt
barely passed in the house of representatives before being introduced to the
general floor of the senate at session's end. 4 1 Notwithstanding the legislature's
attempts, until Stone, there was no indication the South Carolina Supreme
Court was on the heels of abolishment, either.
C.

ProspectiveAbolishment of Common Law Marriage

After examining the historical basis for common law marriage, the Stone
court assessed the modern trend of abolishment in the United States. Although
Alabama was the most recent state to abolish common law marriage via
judicial opinion, the Stone court lent much credence to Pennsylvania's 2003
abolishment in PNC Bank Corporationv. Workers' Compensation Appeal
Board (Stamos),42 whereby the Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court declared

that the paternalistic motivations underpinning the doctrine of common law
marriage are no longer apparent in modern society. 43 According to the Stone
court, the current shift away from paternalism is due, in part, to the fact that,
"[b]y and large, society no longer conditions acceptance upon marital status
or legitimacy of children." 4 4

Following its historical analysis, the court announced a general power to
overrule the common law. 45 In defining its power, the court observed: "We
will act when it has become apparent that the public policy of the State is
offended by outdated rules of law . . .. [C]ommon-law marriage's origins lie
in the common law, and consequently, it may be removed by common-law
mandate, regardless of tacit recognition by our legislature." 46 Transitioning
from the idea of power to the state's current policy goals, the court
acknowledged that, whereas early South Carolina cases cited "immorality,
illegitimacy, and bastardy" stigmatizations as the basis for common law

40. See, e.g., H.B. 3925, 122nd Gen. Assemb., istReg. Sess. (S.C. 2017); S.B. 11, 120th
Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. (S.C. 2013); H.B. 3588, 116th Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. (S.C.
2005); H.B. 4597, 115th Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. (S.C. 2004); H.B. 3625, 115th Gen.
Assemb., IstReg. Sess. (S.C. 2003); H.B. 3774, 114thGen. Assemb., istReg. Sess. (S.C. 2001);
H.B. 3452, 114th Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. (S.C. 2001); H.B. 3668, 113th Gen. Assemb.,
1st Reg. Sess. (S.C. 1999); H.B. 3656, 113th Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. (S.C. 1999); H.B.
4410, 112th Gen. Assemb., istReg. Sess. (S.C. 1998).
41. See H.B. 3774, 114th Gen. Assemb., istReg. Sess. (S.C. 2001).
42. PNC Bank Corp. v. Workers' Comp. Appeal Bd. (Stamos), 831 A.2d 1269 (Pa.
Commw. Ct. 2003).
43. Id. at 1279; Stone, 428 S.C. at 84-85, 833 S.E.2d at 268-69.
44. 428 S.C. at 85, 833 S.E.2d at 269.
45. Id.
46. Id.
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marriage, these factors "are no longer stigmatized by society." 47 Additionally,
the court observed that a presumption of marriage solely on the basis of
cohabitation is improper due to the fact that cohabitation is progressively
common among modern households. 48
Throughout the Stone opinion, it is evident the court's primary concern
was generating consistent outcomes in lower courts through concrete and
efficient analysis. 49 Specifically, the court expressed apprehension in
continually requiring trial courts to engross themselves in the determination
of mutual intent to be married. 50 In determining such intent, the Stone court

noted that "courts struggle mightily to determine if and when parties
expressed [the mutual intent to be married] .

. .

. The solemn institution of

marriage is thereby reduced to a guessing game with significant ramifications
for the individuals involved, as well as any third party dealing with them.""
As a result of the proclaimed inequities of this guessing game, the court singlehandedly professed that the fundamental right to marry deducts a "right to
remain unmarried [that] is equally weighty, particularly when combined with

our admonitions that a person cannot enter into such a union accidentally or
unwittingly."

2

47. Id. at 83, 88, 833 S.E.2d at 268, 271 (citing Jeanes v. Jeanes, 255 S.C. 161, 166-67,
177 S.E.2d 537, 539 (1970)).
48. Id. at 86, 833 S.E.2d at 269; see also Jeanes, 255 S.C. at 166, 177 S.E.2d at 539
("There is a strong presumption in favor of marriage by cohabitation, apparently matrimonial,
coupled with social acceptance over a long period of time." (citing In re Greenfield's Estate, 14
S.E.2d 916, 919 (W. Va. 1965))).
49. See Stone, 428 S.C. at 82, 85, 833 S.E.2d at 267, 269 ("We have concluded the
institution's foundations have eroded with the passage of time, and the outcomes it produces are
unpredictable and often convoluted.... [C]ourts struggle mightily to determine if and when
parties expressed the requisite intent to be married, which is entirely understandable given its
subjective and circumstantial nature.").
50. Id. at 85-86, 833 S.E.2d at 269.
51. Id. Conflicting evidence regarding the existence of common law marriage often
creates time-consuming and costly litigation for the courts and parties. In Thomas v. 5 Star
Transportation, 412 S.C. 1, 6, 770 S.E.2d 183, 186 (Ct. App. 2015), the plaintiff filed suit in
2008 for workers' compensation benefits after her partner's death. After more than six years of
litigation determining the existence of a common law marriage, the South Carolina Court of
Appeals finally issued its opinion. See id. at 1-17, 770 S.E.2d at 183-92. In Callen v. Callen,
365 S.C. 618, 627, 620 S.E.2d 59, 64 (2005), the South Carolina Supreme Court reversed the
family court's award of attorney's fees in the amount of $113,405.98. Thus, this case
demonstrates the vast expense of litigating the existence of a common law marriage, even at the

trial level.
52. 428 S.C. at 86, 833 S.E.2d at 269 (citing Callen, 365 S.C. at 626, 620 S.E.2d at 63).
The court was expressly worried about common myths indicating requirements that partners
cohabitate for seven years or hold themselves out as being married. See Cynthia G. Bowman,
Note, A FeministProposalto Bring Back Common Law Marriage,75 OR. L. REV. 709, 711 n.6
(1996); Editorial, supra note 18.
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D. Refining the Test of Common Law Marriage

Before Stone, South Carolina courts applied two interchangeable and
contradictory standards to common law marriage: (1) a preponderance of the
evidence 53 or (2) a rebuttable presumption-based on apparently matrimonial
cohabitation-which could only be overcome by "strong, cogent, satisfactory,
or conclusive evidence" to the contrary.54 Due to the nature of prospective
abolishment, the Stone court conceded there remains a class of individuals
rightfully entitled to recognition for common law marriages entered into
before the issuance of the opinion. 55 However, the court expressed concern
that applying the above standards created too much uncertainty. 56
Consequently, the court adopted a new standard of clear and convincing
evidence to ensure that a couple cannot enter into a common law marriage
unless the couple fully intended to form a marriage. 57 Under this standard, "a
party [must] show a degree of proof sufficient to produce a firm belief in the
allegations sought to be established." 8
Although
the
Stone court
acknowledged
its
ability
to
"retroactively . . . divest vested rights," 59 the court reached a decision that
undermined the established principles on which thousands of couples have
relied. Specifically, the court adopted a prospective approach whereby "no
individual may enter into a common-law marriage in South Carolina after

[July 24, 2019]."60 Rather, any marriage after this date must be manifested by
a marriage license in order to be valid. 61If a party alleges that a common law
marriage was entered into prior to July 24, 2019, the party is "required to

demonstrate mutual assent to be married by clear and convincing evidence.
Courts may continue to weigh the same circumstantial factors traditionally

53. Tarnowski v. Lieberman, 348 S.C. 616, 620, 560 S.E.2d 438, 440 (Ct. App. 2002)
(first citing Kirby v. Kirby, 270 S.C. 137, 140, 241 S.E.2d 415, 416 (1978); and then citing Ex
parte Blizzard, 185 S.C. 131, 133, 193 S.E. 633, 634 (1937)).
54. Jeanes, 255 S.C. at 167, 177 S.E.2d at 540.
55. See Stone, 428 S.C. at 87, 833 S.E.2d at 270 ("We see no benefit to undoing numerous
marriages which heretofore were considered valid in our State, and we will not foreclose relief
to individuals who relied on the doctrine.").
56. See id at 87-88, 833 S.E.2d at 270-71.
57. See id. at 89, 833 S.E.2d at 271 ("[C]onsistent with our preceding discussion
regarding the sanctity of a marital relationship and our reticence to impose one on those who did
not fully intend it, we believe a heightened burden of proof is warranted.").
58. Id. (citing In re Estate of Duffy, 392 S.C. 41, 46, 707 S.E.2d 447, 450 (Ct. App.
2011)).
59. Russo v. Sutton, 310 S.C. 200, 205 n.5, 422 S.E.2d 750, 753 n.5 (1992) (citing Hooks
v. S. Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 291 S.C. 41, 351 S.E.2d 900 (Ct. App. 1986)).
60. Stone, 428 S.C. at 87, 833 S.E.2d at 270.
61. Id.

https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol71/iss4/11

10

Spires: Tying the "Not": The South Carolina Supreme Court's Prospective A
2020]

TYING THE "NOT"

915

considered, but they may not indulge in presumptions based on cohabitation,
no matter how apparently matrimonial."

62

III. THE ISSUE OF AUTHORITY

The legislature can undoubtedly codify a common law doctrine; however,
this action would prompt the question: Did the South Carolina General
Assembly do so with the passage of § 20-1-360 of the South Carolina Code? 63
The Stone court assumed the statute is actually not a codification, stating:
"While our legislature has not expressly codified common-law marriage, it
has recognized the institution by exception to the general requirement to
obtain a marriage license." 64 Additionally, later on in the opinion, the court
observed that because common law marriage is a purely common law
doctrine, "it may be removed by common-law mandate, regardless of tacit
recognition by our legislature." 65 This observation begs the questions-What
exactly is tacit legislative recognition, and does such recognition constitute

codification? Upon thorough analysis, it appears the answer to the latter is
affirmative-tacit legislative recognition is effective codification. 66
Although codification of common law marriage is rather rare, one
example of a state having done so is California.67 In 1850, the California
Supreme Court first recognized common law marriage, stating: "Marriage is

a civil contract, and no form necessary to its validity." 68 Subsequently, in
1872, California passed a statute codifying common law marriage: "Marriage

is a personal relation arising out of a civil contract, to which the consent of
parties capable of making it is necessary. Consent alone will not constitute
marriage; it must be followed by a solemnization, or by a mutual assumption
of marital rights, duties, or obligations." 69 Despite the statute's failure to refer
62. Id. at 89, 833 S.E.2d at 271.
63. "Nothing contained in this article shall render illegal any marriage contracted without
the issuance of a license." § 20-1-360 (2014).
64. 428 S.C. at 83, 833 S.E.2d at 269.
65. Id. at 85, 833 S.E.2d at 270 (citing Russo v. Sutton, 310 S.C. 200, 204, 422 S.E.2d
750, 753 (1992)).
66. See Motsingerv. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., Civil Action No. 4:11-01734, 2013 WL
6179386, at *7 (D.S.C. Nov. 25, 2013) ("In South Carolina, the legality of common law marriage
is codified at S.C. Code Ann. § 20-1-360 .... "); In re Estate of Smith, No. E2016-02254-COAR3-CV, 2017 WL 4422339, at *1 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 4, 2017) ("South Carolina has codified
the common law marriage doctrine in section 20-1-360 of the South Carolina Code .... ");
Hedgecock, supra note 21, at 556 ("South Carolina has codified the common law marriage
doctrine in section 20-1-360 of the South Carolina Code .... ").
67. LIND, supra note 23, at 143 ("In California, case law had supported the common law
marriage doctrine since the beginning of the 1850s, but in a definitive breakthrough in 1872, the
state regulated the doctrine through legislation, which was very unusual in the United States.").
68. Graham v. Bennet, 2 Cal. 503, 505 (Cal. 1852).
69. CAL. CIV. CODE § 55 (1872).
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to common law marriage by name, California courts interpreted the statute to
allow common law marriages. In fact, one California Associate Justice noted
that "[California] statutes control the validity of marriages without regard to
the common law."7 0 In addition to California, Montana enacted a substantially
similar statute in 1895.71 Like the California Associate Justice, a Montana
Supreme Court Justice declared common law marriage as synonymous to a
statutory marriage formed by either solemnization or "a mutual and public
assumption of the marital relation." 7 2
Most analogous to § 20-1-360 of the South Carolina Code is the initial
codification of common law marriage in the Dakota Territory, later to be
divided into North Dakota and South Dakota. There, the legislature passed a
session law in 1877 that codified the common law doctrine: "Marriage must
be solemnized, authenticated and recorded as provided in this article; but noncompliance with its provisions does not invalidate any lawful marriage." 3
Upon the establishment of South Dakota as its own individual state, the
Supreme Court of South Dakota conducted a thorough discourse, assessing
the role of this statutory exception within the scheme of formal marriage
requirements. 74 Specifically, evaluating a statutory title similar to the
licensure requirement of South Carolina, the court in In re Svendsen 's Estate
noted:
What other interpretation can be put upon this [statutory exception]
than that any marriage which complies with [the statutory
requirements of a personal relationship arising out of a civil contract
and consent followed by a mutual assumption of marital rights,
duties, or obligations] will be valid regardless of failure to conform
to those requirements looking to the solemnization, authentication,
and recording of the marriage?7 5
Although antiquated in its application due to South Dakota's statutory
amendment prospectively abolishing common law marriage as of July 1,

70. Coon v. Joseph, 237 Cal. Rptr. 873, 878-79 (Cal. Ct. App. 1987) (Barry-Deal, J.,
concurring).
71. MONT. CIV. CODE § 1-1-50 (1895) ("Marriage is a personal relation arising out of a
civil contract, to which the consent of parties capable of making it is necessary. Consent alone
will not constitute marriage; it must be followed by a solemnization, or by a mutual and public
assumption of the marital relation.").
72. See O'Malley v. O'Malley, 129 P. 501, 502 (Mont. 1913).
73. The Revised Codes of the Territory of Dakota § 45 (1877).
74. See In re Svendsen's Estate, 158 N.W. 410 (S.D. 1916).
75. Id. at 413.
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1959,76 perhaps the Stone court should have regarded this opinion for
guidance.
It is widely accepted that a doctrine enacted and regulated solely by the
judiciary is clearly common law based.77 However, when an otherwise
common law doctrine has been acknowledged by the legislature and
subsequently codified, there is doubt as to the judiciary's exclusive authority
over the doctrine. 78 Upon codification of a common law doctrine, the judiciary
no longer has authority to develop a robust area of case law. 79 Rather, the
judiciary's role shifts to that of an interpreter of statutory law.80 Recognizing
its role as an interpretive body after codification of a common law doctrine,
the South Dakota court in In re Svendsen's Estate impressively avoided a

usurpation of legislative power by observing:

'

[W]e are not in the happy position of the common-law jurist who,
untrammeled by statutory enactment, was free, when declaring what
the law was, to give due weight to the changes wrought by advancing
civilization. Today the law-making power is vested in our legislative
bodies-it is they that define the policies of the time-and when they
have spoken, it is for the courts but to construe their words and then
declare and enforce the law as enacted by them. 8
Unlike the South Dakota Supreme Court, the court in Stone ignored the
applicable codification of common law marriage and took matters into its own
hands.
The Stone court cited Russo v. Sutton8 2 as its source of authority to rewrite

common law, stating: "The common law changes when necessary to serve the
needs of the people." 83 Yet, the court's reliance on Russo is largely misplaced.
Recognizing that the South Carolina General Assembly already dispensed
with related common law heart balm actions, 84 the court in Russo
76. S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 25-1-29 (2013).
77. 15A C.J.S. Common Law § 3 (2012).
78. Id. § 16.
79. Id.
80. See generally State v. Johnson, 343 S.C. 693, 695, 541 S.E.2d 855, 857 (2001)
("When interpreting a statute, our primary role is to ascertain the intent of the
legislature.... [W]ords should be given their plan and ordinary meaning, and we should not
look for or try to impose another meaning." (first citing State v. Baker, 310 S.C. 510, 512, 427
S.E.2d 670, 671-72 (1993); and then citing State v. Smith, 330 S.C. 237, 240, 498 S.E.2d 648,
649-50 (Ct. App. 1998))).
81. In re Svendsen's Estate, 158 N.W. 411, 411 (S.D. 1916).
82. Russo v. Sutton, 310 S.C. 200, 204 422 S.E.2d 750, 753 (1992).
83. Stone v. Thompson, 428 S.C. 79, 85, 833 S.E.2d 266, 269 (2019) (citing Russo, 310
S.C. at 204, 422 S.E.2d at 753).
84. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-3-150 (2005).
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prospectively abolished the heart balm action of alienation of affections.8 5 The
Stone court is correct in saying that it has power to eliminate a common law
doctrine; however, Russo is distinguishable from Stone. Unlike the purely

common law doctrine of alienation of affections, common law marriage is
codified. 8 6 In Russo, it is axiomatic that while the legislature may abolish a
common law cause of action, the court may not independently override a
statutory codification.

Two cases more applicable to the power struggle in Stone are those
regarding dog-bite liability in South Carolina. Prior to 1985, South Carolina
common law followed the "one free bite" rule; 87 however, in 1985, the South
Carolina Supreme Court in Hossenlopp v. Cannon8 "rejected the 'one free

bite' rule and imposed quasi-strict liability on dog owners by adopting the
'California Rule' for dog bite liability." 89 In the year following the
Hossenlopp decision, the South Carolina General Assembly codified the
California Rule 90 and "additionally imposed liability on any other persons
having the dog in their 'care or keeping."' 91 In 2009, the South Carolina
Supreme Court revisited the dog-bite liability issue in Harris v. Anderson
County Sheriff's Office. 92 Recognizing the implication of codification, the

court in Harris observed: "This transition from the common law to the
statutory setting, of course, restricts our policy-making role and concomitantly
requires this court to discern legislative intent."93 Regarding any argument

that

§ 20-1-360 of the South Carolina Code fails to directly mention "common

law marriage," neither did the statute at issue in Harris.Yet, the Harriscourt

simply evaluated the unambiguous language of the statute to determine
legislative intent, which the Stone court should have done, as well. 94
When any court undertakes to evaluate legislative intent, such intent
should be "ascertained by interpretation from consideration of the entire act,
85. Russo, 310 S.C. at 204, 422 S.E.2d at 753.
86. See Motsinger v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., Civil Action No. 4:11-01734, 2013 WL
6179386, at *7 (D.S.C. Nov. 25, 2013) ("In South Carolina, the legality of comnon law marriage
is codified at S.C. Code Ann. § 20-1-360 .... ").
87. See Harris v. Anderson Cnty. Sheriff's Office, 381 S.C. 357, 360, 673 S.E.2d 423,
424 (2009); see also Hossenlopp v. Cannon, 285 S.C. 367, 372, 329 S.E.2d 438, 441 (1985).
88. Hossenlopp, 285 S.C. at 372, 329 S.E.2d at 441.
89. Harris, 381 S.C. at 361, 673 S.E.2d at 425.
90. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 47-3-110 (1986) (amended 2013) ("Whenever any person is
bitten or otherwise attacked by a dog while the person is in a public place or is lawfully in a
private place, including the property of the owner of the dog or other person having the dog in
his care or keeping, the owner of the dog or other person having the dog in his care or keeping
is liable for the damages suffered.... If a person provokes a dog into attacking him then the
owner of the dog is not liable.").
91. Harris, 381 S.C. at 362, 673 S.E.2d at 425.
92. See id
93. Id.
94. Id. at 366, 673 S.E.2d at 428.
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its nature and object, and the consequences of construction one way or the
other." 95 The Stone court interpreted § 20-1-360 of the South Carolina Code
as merely directory, 96 but the South Carolina General Assembly's attempts to
abolish common law marriage signals a starkly different view. Considering
the high demands of legislative action in South Carolina, it is hard to imagine
the legislature would exhaust ten legislative sessions over the course of an
eighteen-year period to abolish a statute it perceived as directory. Moreover,
considering that all legislative bills attempting to abolish common law
marriage? have referenced § 20-1-360, this indicates the legislature
recognized that the judicial doctrine of common law marriage and the
statutory exception could not coexist. The fact that, even under public
criticism, the legislature chose not to abolish this statute supports the notion
that it is mandatory, and thus, the Stone court erred by deeming pertinent
statutes tacit recognition.

Upon codification of a common law doctrine, the court's role shifts from
being a creator of common law to an interpreter of statutory law. In Stone, the
court gleaned guidance from the general statutory requirement that all valid
marriages be manifested by a valid marriage license. 98 However, in doing so,
the court essentially handpicked which provisions of the code sections
applied. The court's role is to interpret statutory law, not to abrogate it. The
court noted that it "can discern no more efficacious way to fulfill [predictable,
just outcomes] than to require those who wish to be married in our State to
comply with our statutory requirements." 99 Yet, statutory requirements

conflict with the Stone holding because, as of now, § 20-1-360 recognizes that
a marriage contract is not illegal absent a license, whereas courts require a
license to find a marriage valid. By implication, when a sharp statutory
mandate allows for a valid marriage regardless of licensure, the court cannot
rear its power to declare unlicensed marriages void.
IV. IMPLICATIONS
A.

OF STONE V. THOMPSON

Effects ofAbolishment

Notwithstanding the Stone court's usurpation of power, the repercussions
of Stone are immeasurable. Although the abolishment only applies
prospectively, the force of the decision will be felt for decades to come. Under
95. Skaggs v. Fyffe, 98 S.W.2d 884, 886 (Ky. 1936).
96. See State v. Ward, 204 S.C. 210, 210, 28 S.E.2d 785, 786 (1944) ("[S]tatutes
prescribing the procurement of a license and other formalities to be observed in the
solemnization of marriage .... have uniformly been held directory merely.").
97. See H.B. 3774, 114th Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. (S.C. 2001).
98. See Stone v. Thompson, 428 S.C. 79, 83, 833 S.E.2d 266, 268 (2019).
99. Id. at 86, 833 S.E.2d at 270.
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the doctrine of common law marriage, any married couple was eligible to
enjoy the benefits of marriage and the protections of divorce, notwithstanding
a marriage license or lack thereof'1 00 Because "[v]alid marriage under state
law is . . . a significant status for over a thousand provisions of federal law,"'01
the effect of Stone is a deprivation of myriad liberties, including alimony,
distribution of assets, estate distribution, insurance benefits and spousal
coverage, visitation and custody, and many others.
1.

Alimony

One of the most palpable consequences of Stone is the unavailability of
alimony for common law spouses upon dissolution of their relationship. A
potential award of alimony safeguards a disadvantaged spouse in both fault
and no-fault divorces, 0 2 yet Stone eliminates all common law couples for
qualification by entirely denying the recognition of their marriage in the first
place. Furthermore, because alimony is often granted with termination upon
remarriage of the supported spouse, 03 the result of Stone inequitably allows a
supported spouse to avoid alimony termination.
For example, assume Ed and Allie were married in 2010. After ten years

of marriage, the couple obtained a divorced, and the family court ordered Ed
to pay Allie $1,200 per month in alimony. One year after their divorce was
finalized, Allie began dating Todd. Todd was a multimillionaire who
happened to be the chief executive officer at the marketing firm where Allie
100. Id. at 83, 833 S.E.2d at 268.
101. Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. 644, 670 (2015). See also United States v. Windsor,
570 U.S. 744, 752 (2013); Editorial, supra note 18. As of December 31, 2003, "a total of 1,138
federal statutory provisions classified to the United States Code in which marital status is a factor
in determining or receiving benefits, rights, and privileges." U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY
OFFICE, GAO-04-353R, DEFENSE OF MARRIAGE ACT (2004).

102. Craig v. Craig, 365 S.C. 285, 292, 617 S.E.2d 359, 362 (2005) ("Alimony is a
substitute for the support which is normally incident to the marital relationship." (citing Spence
v. Spence, 260 S.C. 526, 529, 197 S.E.2d 683, 684 (1973))); Pirri v. Pirri, 369 S.C. 258, 267,
631 S.E.2d 279, 284 (Ct. App. 2006) ("The purpose of alimony is to place the supported spouse
in the position he or she enjoyed during the marriage." (citing Craig,365 S.C. at 292, 617 S.E.2d
at 362))); Prevatte v. Prevatte, 297 S.C. 345, 352, 377 S.E.2d 114, 118 (Ct. App. 1989)
(affirming an award of alimony to common law wife after she sought divorce on the grounds of
common law husband's adultery).
103. 13 S.C. JUR. Divorce § 55 (1992) ("Periodic, rehabilitative, and reimbursement
alimony are also terminable upon the remarriage of the payee spouse."). See also S.C. CODE
ANN. § 20-3-130(B) (2014) ("Alimony and separate maintenance and support awards may be
granted pendente lite and permanently . . subject to conditions as the court considers just
including, but not limited to: (1) Period alimony to be paid but terminating on the remarriage or
continued cohabitation of the supported spouse . . . . (3) Rehabilitative alimony in a finite sum
to be . . . terminable upon the remarriage or continued cohabitation of the supported
spouse .... (4) Reimbursement alimony to be . . terminable on the remarriage or continued
cohabitation of the supported spouse .... ").
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worked. Allie later moved in with Todd, and they shared living expenses. Two
months after living together, Allie received a call from her sister, requesting
that Allie care for their ailing mother once per month to give their father a
short break. Allie agreed, and she traveled to North Carolina one Friday per
month, leaving Todd behind to care for the home. Eventually, Allie and Todd
began introducing themselves as husband and wife at work, but because Allie
knew that her alimony would terminate upon remarriage, she and Todd
refused to sign a marriage license or have a formal ceremony. Meanwhile, Ed
was a teacher, getting by on the bare minimum due to his income being
significantly reduced by alimony payments. Prior to Stone, Allie and Todd's
relationship would likely constitute a common law marriage, and Ed could
petition for termination of alimony on the basis of Allie's remarriage. After
Stone, however, Allie can enjoy the benefits of alimony with no strings
attached because Allie and Todd's relationship does not qualify as a common
law marriage. 04

Although an obligor can seek a remedy under § 20-3-150 of the South
Carolina Code-which requires the court to modify alimony if a supported
spouse continuously cohabitated with a different partner for ninety days-Ed
is out of luck because the cohabitation period technically restarted each time
Allie left to care for her mother. 0 5 Justice Hearn, the author of Stone, has
104. See Jeanes v. Jeanes, 255 S.C. 161, 167-68, 177 S.E.2d 537, 540 (1970) (affirming a
family court's decision to terminate alimony upon the common law marriage of the supported
spouse); Rodgers v. Herron, 226 S.C. 317, 334-35, 85 S.E.2d 104, 112-13 (1954)
(demonstrating that a subsequent common law marriage can terminate trust income conditioned
on remarriage of the beneficiary).
105. S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-3-150 (2014) ("If the court awards [permanent
alimony] . . upon the remarriage or continued cohabitation of the supported spouse[,] the
amount fixed in the decree for his or her support shall cease . . . .For purposes of this section
and unless otherwise agreed to in writing by the parties, 'continued cohabitation' means the
supported spouse resides with another person in a romantic relationship for a period of ninety or
more consecutive days."). The South Carolina Supreme Court applies a strict interpretation of
"continued cohabitation," such that even if the supported spouse spends one day away from an
alleged cohabiting romantic partner, the period of cohabitation restarts. Under this interpretation,
few supporting spouses have successfully proved continued cohabitation. See, e.g., McKinney
v. Pedery, 413 S.C. 475, 486, 776 S.E.2d 566, 572 (2015) ("During the time in question, [wife]
lived at her son's house in Duncan approximately two days of every week, which means that
under a literal interpretation of the statute, [wife and her romantic partner] could not have lived
'under the same roof' for ninety consecutive days."); Eason v. Eason, 384 S.C. 473, 477-81,
682 S.E.2d 804, 806-08 (2009) (affirming a family court decision denying termination of
alimony upon a showing that wife was involved in a two-year adulterous relationship because
although both parties admitted to living together, "they never cohabited for more than two [to]
four weeks at a time"); Biggins v. Burdette, 392 S.C. 241, 245-46, 708 S.E.2d 237, 239 (Ct.
App. 2011) ("[E]ven if the parties did reside together for certain periods of time, according to
[romantic partner's] testimony, [wife] 'kicked him out' when she had visitors and he took all his
things with him . . .. The evidence shows the parties separated to protect [wife's] reputation, not
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acknowledged the practical impossibility of using this protection to terminate
alimony: "Few people live under the same roof for ninety consecutive days;
indeed, I would venture to say that because of their work schedule, none of
the members of this court could be considered to have resided with his or her
spouse for ninety consecutive days."1

06

Before Stone, supporting spouses

could circumvent this provision if the court found that their ex-spouse formed
a common law marriage with another individual. However, the inequitable
implication of Stone is such that an obligor is unable to terminate alimony
payments even when the supported spouse is, for all intents and purposes,
enjoying a quasi-marital relationship. As a result, a spouse like Ed is left
footing the bill for his ex-wife's rendezvous with her new lover, despite
having a subpar salary and a mountain of personal expenses.
2.

DistributionofAssets

Upon dissolution of marriage, South Carolina courts apply fifteen
statutory factors1 07 to determine the superior method of equitably distributing
marital property in a particular case.1 08 Equitable distribution is a tremendous
benefit of marriage because it utilizes equity principles to ensure each spouse
receives fair compensation for their marital efforts and contributions.1 09 Thus,
the contributions of an economically successful spouse will not always
impose a financial burden on an unemployed spouse. Rather, the court
considers equitable factors when distributing funds, including whether an
unemployed spouse maintained the home and took care of children.'' 0
In this regard, the abolishment of common law marriage disadvantages
couples that would otherwise qualify as common law married. Now, instead
to circumvent the statute."); Fiddie v. Fiddie, 384 S.C. 120, 126, 681 S.E.2d 42, 45 (Ct. App.
2009) (affirming a family court decision not to terminate alimony because "testimony from
[w]ife's sister and friend corroborated [w]ife's testimony that she stayed with them for several
days each month .... [not] in an attempt to circumvent the continued cohabitation statute .... );
Feldman v. Feldman, 380 S.C. 538, 542-45, 670 S.E.2d 669, 671-72 (Ct. App. 2008)
(demonstrating the overwhelming difficulty of proving ninety days of consecutive cohabitation,
even with private investigator surveillance); Semkenv. Semken, 379 S.C. 71, 77-78, 664 S.E.2d
493, 497 (Ct. App. 2008) (reversing termination of alimony because although wife and her
romantic partner were romantically involved, romantic partner had two homes during the period
of their relationship, thus he did not spend ninety consecutive nights with wife).
106. McKinney, 413 S.C. at 491, 776 S.E.2d at 574 (Ream, J., concurring).
107. S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-3-620 (2014).
108. See id. § 20-3-610 (2014) ("During the marriage a spouse shall acquire . . a vested
special equity and ownership right in the marital property . . which equity and ownership right
are subject to apportionment between the spouses by the family courts of this State at the time
marital litigation is filed or commenced as provided in Section 20-3-620.").
109. See Lee R. Russ, Annotation, Divorce: EquitableDistributionDoctrine,41 A.L.R.4th
481, 484 (1985).
110. See id.
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of equitably distributing marital property and reimbursing marital
contributions, cohabitants must divide their property under traditional rules of
property law." Without a remedy like equitable distribution, there is no
consideration of the couple's joint effort."1 2 Thus, a wife who may have
contributed substantially more to the enhancement of a retirement account in
her husband's name, for example, may be unable to recover. Whereas a family
court would consider this contribution in the context of marriage and
distribute assets accordingly, an unmarried couple must depend on a circuit
court's title-based approach, likely resulting in their contributions being
viewed as a gift." 3
The failure to recognize transmutation among an otherwise common law
couple is another consequence of abolishing common law marriage."4 Under
the doctrine of transmutation, separate property can be converted, or
transmuted, into marital property and thus subject to equitable distribution if
"the property becomes so commingled as to be untraceable; [the property] is
utilized by the parties in support of the marriage; or [the property] is titled
jointly or otherwise utilized in such manner as to evidence an intent by the
parties to make it marital property.""5 A common example of transmuted
property is a home that one partner owned prior to the relationship but utilized
as a marital home during the marriage."1 6 Because the owner utilized the home
in a manner indicating intent to become marital property, the home is
transmuted and, therefore, subject to equitable distribution. "? Hypothetically,
the unavailability of common law marriage may result in thousands of dollars
in lost equity, and ignoring the doctrine of transmutation in such contexts

111. Nat'l Legal Research Grp., Inc., Cohabitation Partition, 20 EQUITABLE
J., no. 10, 2003, at 117, 117 ("When the court divides property between
unmarried persons, it does so under the law of partition, not the law of equitable distribution.").
See also Carlson v. Olson, 256 N.W.2d 249 (Minn. 1977) (couple clearly met the requirements
of a common law marriage yet had to divide property by partition after dissolution of the
relationship because their jurisdiction no longer recognized common law marriage).
112. See Doris Jonas Freed, Family Law in the Fifty States: An Overview, 21 FAM. L.Q.
DISTRIBUTION

417, 456 (1988).
113. See id.
114. Pirri v. Pirri, 369 S.C. 258, 286, 631 S.E.2d 279, 286 (Ct. App. 2006) ("Nonmarital
property may be transmuted into marital property. In determining whether property has been
transmuted, courts must consider whether the property: (1) 'becomes so commingled with
marital property as to be untraceable;' (2) is titled jointly; or (3) 'is utilized by the parties in
support of the marriage or in some other manner so as to evidence an intent by the parties to
make it marital property."' (quoting Jenkins v. Jenkins, 345 S.C. 88, 89, 545 S.E.2d 531, 537
(Ct. App. 2001))).
115. Hussey v. Hussey, 280 S.C. 418, 423, 312 S.E.2d 267, 270-71 (Ct. App. 1984).
116. Drayton v. Drayton, No. S.CT.CIV.2015-0068, 2016 WL 4543192, at *7 (V.I. Aug.
30, 2016).
117. Id.
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inevitably results in a prejudicial distribution of separate property according
only to title only.
3.

Estate Distribution

In South Carolina, the law provides a default distribution in formal
marriage such that, if a decedent dies intestate, "[t]he intestate share of the
surviving spouse is: (1) if there is no surviving issue of the decedent, the entire
intestate estate; (2) if there are surviving issue, one-half of the intestate
estate."118 As a result of Stone, an otherwise common law spouse surrenders
his or her default right to a minimum 50% share in a spousal estate. To ensure
that a living partner benefits from the estate of a decedent, an otherwisequalifying couple must make certain arrangements that are not required for
formally married couples.11 9 Considering that a 2019 study of 1,003 adults

revealed that only 57% of them had estate planning documents, the removal
of a legal default protection for such a large subset of individuals is drastic.120
To ensure a right in their partner's estate, an otherwise common law
couple must, first and foremost, establish a will or revocable living trust,
explicitly designating one another as beneficiary or trustee.121 This simply
guarantees distribution according to the decedent's desires. To account for
possible illness or other incapacitations, a couple must then complete
healthcare directives or living wills, along with a durable financial power of
attorney.1 22 Otherwise, a partner may not have the right to make healthcare
decisions or the adequate funding to provide care for his or her partner.1 23
These additional requirements do not resemble each and every precaution that
couples should take to safeguard their rights in the event of death or
incapacity, but they do provide a comprehensive overview of the complexities
that confront otherwise common law married couples.
4.

InsuranceBenefits and Spousal Coverage

Most state, federal, and private insurance policies allow policyholders to
seek coverage for their spouses and dependents, and these policies often
118. S.C. CODE ANN. § 62-2-102 (2009).
119. Valerie Keene, Estate Planning for Common Law Marriages, NOLO
https://www.nolo.com/legal-encyclopedia/estate-planning-for-comnmon-law-marriages.html

[https://pena.cc/XD8S-7EVB].
120. More Than Half of American Adults Don't Have a Will, 2017 Survey Shows,
https://www.caring.com/caregivers/estate-planning/wills-survey/2017-survey/

CARING.COM,

[https://perma.cc/MMR6-XBXH].
121. Keene, supra note 119.
122. Id.
123. Id.
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define spouse according to state law.1 24 Thus, married couples enjoy virtually
as many insurance benefits as they can afford. After Stone, however, the
definition of a spouse encompasses only those South Carolina citizens with
valid marriage licenses.1 25 Accordingly, couples that would otherwise qualify
for spousal coverage on health insurance,'1 26 life insurance,1 27 and automobile

insurance policies1 28 may be left empty-handed. A simple solution to this
inequity seems to be for a couple to get married. If an insured partner passes

away or becomes ill, however, the mere absence of a certificate will prevent
the other partner from claiming spousal coverage to fund immediate needs.
Two other implications of Stone arise in the employment law context.
First, under the South Carolina Workers' Compensation Act, a spouse is
eligible for dependent survivor benefits under § 42-1-175 of the South
Carolina Code-which defines a surviving spouse as "the decedent's wife or
husband living with or dependent for support upon the decedent at the time of
the decedent's death or living apart from the decedent for justifiable cause or
by reason of desertion by the decedent at such time."1 29 This is another
example of a remarkable benefit of marriage, especially for those who do not
have life insurance or other existing protections to safeguard their finances in
the case of unexpected death. Unfortunately for those affected by Stone,
because a common law spouse is no longer considered the wife or husband of
a decedent, there are absolutely no survivor benefits available to such a
dependent under South Carolina's current workers' compensation regime.1 30
Inevitably, this shift in definition will leave the surviving partner with even

more of a financial burden after the death of a loved one.

124. See JOSEPH S. ADAMS & TODD A. SOLOMON, DOMESTIC PARTNER BENEFITS: AN

EMPLOYERS GUIDE ch. 3 (7th ed. 2011), Westlaw 24954707.
125. See 428 S.C. 79, 86, 833 S.E.2d 266, 269-70 (2019).
126. In re Estate of Stodola, 519 N.W.2d 97, 99 (Iowa Ct. App. 1994) (demonstrating the
ability of a health insurance policyholder to seek spousal coverage for his common law wife);
Poland Twp. Bd. of Tr.s v. Swesey, No. 02 CA 185, 2003 WL 22946148, at *1, *8 (Ohio Ct.
App. Dec. 12, 2003) (affirming a jury's finding of common law marriage, thus allowing the
couple to be eligible for family coverage as opposed to single coverage).
127. Moore v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 949 F. Supp. 2d 1201, 1210 (M.D. Ala. 2013) (finding
common law wife was entitled to the benefits of a dependent-life-insurance policy on common
law husband after he died of lung cancer); Baker v. Mays & Mays, 199 S.W.2d 279, 284-85
(Tex. Civ. App. 1946) (holding that common law wife had an insurable interest in the life of
common law husband, thus entitling her to life insurance benefits after his death).
128. Bell v. Progressive Direct Ins. Co., 407 S.C. 565, 582-83, 757 S.E.2d 399, 408 (2014)
(demonstrating the possibility of spousal coverage for a common law couple whose automobile
insurance policy covers resident relatives); Whyte v. Blair, 885 P.2d 791, 795 (Utah 1994)
(showing the possibility of a common law spouse's coverage as a family member of the covered
spouse).
129. S.C. CODE ANN. § 42-1-175 (2015).
130. See id.
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Second, and perhaps the most extreme result of Stone, is the
abolishment's effect on Family and Medical Leave Act coverage. The Act
defines "husband or wife" as follows:
[T]he other person with whom an individual entered into marriage as
defined or recognized under state law for purposes of marriage in the
State in which the marriage was entered into .

. .

. This definition

includes an individual in a same-sex or common law marriage that
either: (1) Was entered into in a State that recognizes such marriages;
or (2) If entered into outside of any State, is valid in the place where
entered into and could have been entered into in at least one State.131
An implication of Stone is that, after the date of the opinion, a couple must
register a valid marriage license with the state in order to seek covered medical
leave to care for a spouse. Hypothetically, this means that a couple in the year
2060 may have been together for forty years, yet neither can take leave to care
for their terminally ill partner. This is an unfortunate outcome for all involved,

particularly for those who do not realize their need for coverage until their
partner is already ill or unexpectedly incompetent, or those who, for possible
religious or personal reasons, are not ready to enter into a formal marriage.
5.

Visitation and Custody

When a child is born to married parents, the Supreme Court of South
Carolina has declared "a common law presumption that [the child] is a child
of the marriage."1 32 Unless a husband submits evidence rebutting this
presumption,1 33 his presumed paternity will prevail. In the case of marital

separation, both parents have full custody rights to their child until a family
court orders otherwise.1 34 Upon petition for custody or upon divorce
131. 29 C.F.R. § 825.102 (2018).
132. Fisher v. Tucker, 388 S.C. 388, 392, 697 S.E.2d 548, 550 (2010); see also Chandler
v. Merrell, 291 S.C. 224, 225-26, 353 S.E.2d 133, 134 (1987) ("The presumption of legitimacy
is one of the strongest known to law. Every child born in wedlock is presumed to be legitimate."
(citations omitted)).
133. The admissibility of evidence in a paternity hearing is governed by S.C. CODE ANN.
§ 63-17-60 (2010). Examples of admissible evidence include genetic test results, refusal of a
party to submit to genetic testing, and testimony of a husband and wife. Id. § 63-17-60(1)-(2),
(8). Specifically, evidence of test results with a paternity probability of 95% or higher and
evidence of a birth certificate containing the mother and the petitioner's signatures create a
rebuttable presumption. Id. § 63-17-60(3), (5).
134. See Gregory S. Forman, How Is Child Custody Determined?, GREGORY S. FORMAN,
P.C. (2009), https://www.gregoryforman.com/faqs/how-is-child-custody-determined/#:-:text=
South%20Carolina%201aw%20requires%20the,awarded%20to%20the%20primary%20caretak
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proceedings, § 63-5-30 of the South Carolina Code recognizes that currently
or previously married parents have "equal power, rights, and duties, and
neither parent has any right paramount to the right of the other concerning the
custody of [minor children.]"1 3 5 Beginning on equal footing, a family court
evaluates the best interests of the child in order to determine whether custody
or visitation is appropriate.1 36 Absent a wife's showing that her husband is an
unfit father, the court will typically allow the father to have unsupervised
visitation at a minimum. 137

In terms of visitation and custody, the immediate ramification of Stone
will affect a specific type of father; however, this effect is incredibly harsh
when comparing the rights of a married father to those of an unmarried father.
For example, consider a father, Chris, who began a relationship with his
girlfriend, Samantha, in the winter of 2019. Throughout their five-year

relationship, Chris and Samantha filed joint tax returns, bought a home
together, and introduced one another as husband and wife. Eventually,
Samantha became pregnant, and the couple was elated. Samantha had a son
named Elijah, but while in the hospital, Samantha discovered Chris was
cheating on her. Thereafter, Samantha refused to acknowledge Chris on
Elijah's birth certificate, and in fact, she requested that hospital security keep
Chris away from her room. Prior to Stone, Chris and Samantha would likely
constitute a common law married couple, Chris would be Elijah's presumed
biological father, and Chris would inevitably be entitled to custody or
visitation. However, because Chris and Samantha entered into a relationship
after the July 24, 2019 opinion, Chris is deprived of these rights. Instead, he
has the rights of an unmarried father, which, unfortunately for him, are
unfavorable in South Carolina.

When a South Carolina child, like Elijah, is born out of wedlock, § 6317-20(B) of the South Carolina Code presumes custody with the child's
mother.1 38 In order to gain any right of custody or visitation, an unmarried
er [https://penna.cc/7Y8J-HY5C] (listing a non-exhaustive list of factors courts should consider
in custody cases per S.C. CODE ANN. § 63-15-240(B)).
135. S.C. CODE ANN. § 63-5-30 (2010); see also Kisling v. Allison, 343 S.C. 674, 678,
541 S.E.2d 273, 275 (Ct. App. 2001) ("In South Carolina, in custody matters, the father and
mother are in parity as to entitlement of the child. When analyzing the right to custody as
between a father and mother, equanimity is mandated. We place our approbation upon the rule
that in South Carolina, there is no preference given to the father or mother in regard to custody
of the child. The parents stand in perfect equipoise as the custody analysis begins.").
136. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 63-15-240(B) (2010 & Supp. 2019) (listing seventeen
statutory factors that a family court may consider in determining custody); Shirley v. Shirley,
342 S.C. 324, 330-31, 536 S.E.2d 427, 430 (Ct. App. 2000).
137. See Forman, supra note 134.
138. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 63-17-20(B) (2010) ("Unless the court orders otherwise, the
custody of an illegitimate child is solely in the natural mother unless the mother has relinquished
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father must overcome several hurdles. First, the father must establish his
paternity.1 39 As the South Carolina Center for Fathers and Families notes, if
the father does not establish paternity, "[t]he father has no legal say in
decisions such as education, medical treatment[,] or religion .

.

. does not have

the right to be notified if his child is being adopted[.]"1 40 Although it would
seem sufficient, acknowledgement of fatherhood on a child's birth certificate
does not legally establish paternity, and the father's requirements vary
depending on the compliance of his child's mother.141
If a child's mother consents to the father establishing paternity, the mother
and father can sign a Paternity Acknowledgement Affidavit either in the
hospital or at a health department in the county of their child's birth.1 42
However, if a child's mother opposes the father establishing paternity, she has
incredible power over the situation. In such a situation, the father must first
complete DSS Form 27103.143 Upon completion, the father must undergo a

test to match his DNA with that of the child,1 44 and this test must positively
identify the father as the child's biological match in order to legally establish
paternity.1 45

If a father fails to take the appropriate steps to establish paternity, his
child's mother will have incredible power over his rights to the child. For
example, if the father has not filed a claim of paternity with the Responsible
Father Registry and is not actively present in the child's life, a mother may
have the unilateral ability to terminate the father's rights or place the child for
adoption without notice to the father.1 46 Although this example is rather
her rights to the child. If paternity has been acknowledged or adjudicated, the father may petition
the court for rights of visitation or custody in a proceeding before the court apart from an action
to establish paternity."); see also Establishing Paternity, S.C. CTR. FOR FATHERS & FAMS.,
https://www. scfathersandfamilies.com/fatherhood-issues/establishing-paternity/
[https://perma.cc/M59K-BS45].
139. EstablishingPaternity, supra note 138.
140. Id.
141. What Are My Rights as an Unwed Parent?, CATE & BROUGH LAW FIRM P.A.,
https://www.thecatelawfirm.com/what-are-my-rights-as-an-unwed-parent/
[https://perma.cc/7WHW-ZW4Q] ("Putting a father's name on a birth certificate is not the same
thing as establishing paternity, so a mother still has full rights even in this situation.").
142. Legal Paternity Actions,
S.C.
CTR.
FOR
FATHERS
&
FAMS.,
https://www. scfathersandfamilies.com/fatherhood-issues/establishing-paternity/legal-paternityactions/ [https://perma.cc/PMM7-7R6M]. The Department of Social Services charges a $15 fee
for completion of this form. Id.
143. Id. The Department of Social Services charges a $25 fee for completion of this form.
Id.
144. Id. If the test indicates a match, the test fee is waived. Id. If the test does not indicate
a match, the individual is charged a testing fee. Id.
145. See id.
146. Responsible

Father

Registry,

S.C.

CTR.

FOR

FATHERS

&

FAMS.,

https://www. scfathersandfamilies.com/fatherhood-issues/establishing-paternity/responsiblefather-registry/ [https://perma.cc/78F6-LQGX].
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drastic, it goes to show the incredible disparity in married fathers' rights as
compared to unmarried fathers' rights. Whereas § 63-9-310(A)(2) of the
South Carolina Code requires consent from both married parents before
someone can adopt their child (regardless of the father's involvement in his
child's life), the comparable statute for unmarried fathers requires a father's
consent only when he can overcome substantial burdens of proof.147
Even after a father establishes legal paternity, however, he must overcome
additional hurdles to ensure visitation or custody.1 48 Assuming not every
relationship ends on good terms, vindictive mothers may leverage visitation
or custody, making it increasingly difficult for unwed fathers to obtain these
rights. According to Robert Franklin, attorney and journalist for National
Parents Organization, this creates a scenario where fathers "are still under the
thumb of their child's mother.1 49 Further, if an unmarried father seeking
custody cannot access his child, he faces a disadvantage under the South
Carolina Supreme Court's "assumption that custody will be awarded to the
primary caretaker." 5 0 Thus, an unwed father begins the process at the short
end of the stick, so to speak. First, he must overcome excessive impediments
to prove his paternity, and then, he must formally petition for visitation and
custody, if applicable.
For both married and unmarried fathers, a custody case presents a plethora
of challenges. However, because an unmarried father does not have default
rights under South Carolina law like married fathers do, he must successfully
prove further administrative burdens, risking even more litigation to ensure

participation in his child's life."' Unfortunately, the abolishment of common
law marriage may isolate unmarried fathers from their children until a court
orders visitation or custody. Stone undoubtedly places an undue burden on
fathers in otherwise-qualifying relationships by requiring not only the
establishment of legal paternity but also an uphill battle for visitation or
custody. Unless and until a father establishes legal paternity, his child's

147. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 63-9-310(4)-(5) (2010). If a child is over six months at the
time of placement, an unmarried father's consent is required only if he "has maintained
substantial and continuous or repeated contact with the child" through paying a reasonable
amount of child support and either visiting the child monthly or regularly communicating with
the child. § 63-9-310(4). If a child is under six months at the time of placement, an unmarried
father's consent is required only if he paid a reasonable amount of child support or continuously
lived with the mother six months immediately preceding placement and held himself out to be
the father of the child during this period. § 63-9-310(5).
148. Robert Franklin, South Carolina:Still Keeping Single Dads Out Of Children'sLives,
NAT'L PARENTS ORG., https://nationalparentsorganization.org/blog/22044-south-carolina-stillkeeping-single-dads-out-of-children-s-lives [https://perma.cc/VB5N-LJNK].
149. Id.
150. Patel v. Patel, 359 S.C. 515, 527, 599 S.E.2d 114, 120 (2004).
151. See Forman, supra note 134.
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mother controls the scope of his rights, and he is much more vulnerable than
a married father with assumed rights.15 2
B.

The State of Existing Cohabitants'Rights

Existing law dictates that "a man and woman cohabiting . . do not
acquire, by reason of such cohabitation alone, any rights in property
accumulated in the name of the other, regardless of their good faith."1 53
Compared to the benefits of a marital relationship, couples who would have
constituted common law spouses prior to Stone now have drastically different
rights upon dissolution. As a result of Stone, cohabitating partners that fail to
complete a valid marriage license cannot seek equitable distribution through
family court. Instead, cohabiting partners must seek remedies through contract
or property law, whereby circuit courts primarily concentrate on pooling and
"

contribution to establish cohabitant rights.
The most litigated aspect of cohabitant rights to personal property is
pooling, a concept similar to the marital doctrine of transmutation.1 55 To
determine whether cohabitants pooled their income, assets, or debts, the court
evaluates the following:
For what length of time have the parties pooled the property or funds?
What is the form in which the pooled funds or assets are held (e.g.,
title of bank account, name or names on real estate title, names on
credit cards, person who is listed on bills)? What was their stated
intent in pooling (e.g., support an ill partner, support a stay-at-home

person, use of a common bank account, creating joint or coownership or property, giving of gift to a partner, etc.)? Is there a
sizable disparity in the property or amounts pooled (e.g., one person

contributes significantly more, or less, than the partner)?

56

In addition to pooling, the court may evaluate contribution. 157 Unlike
pooling, contribution is a concept that measures the interests parties have in
acquired property based on the efforts each party made in the form of "labor,
152. Franklin, supra note 148 ("Unmarried fathers have no rights to their children in South
Carolina and, even if they prove paternity, are still under the thumb of their child's mother. She
must consent to his visitation; if she doesn't, the onus legal and financial is on him to prove
his worth. Needless to say, no such requirement is placed on the mother.").
153. George L. Blum, Annotation, PropertyRights Arisingfrom Relationship of Couple
Cohabiting Without Marriage, 69 A.L.R.5th 219 (1999).
154. 95 AM. JUR. PROOF OF FACTS 3D Cohabitantsand Domestic Partners§ 5 (2007).
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. Id.
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capital, or the like."' 58 Thus, contribution resembles more of an effort-based
investment, whereas pooling is exclusively monetary.
Upon dissolution of a cohabitant relationship, another consideration is
interest in real property. If both partners hold title to real estate through a joint
tenancy and cannot agree to partition, one of the partners must sue for partition

in order to either "have the property sold and the proceeds divided in
proportionate shares among the owners" or divide the property such that "each
owner receives a physical portion of the property equal to his percentage of

ownership."1 59 In the case of a joint tenancy, failure to sue for partition before
the death of either partner will result in survivorship rights to the opposing
partner.1 60 If the parties own real estate through a tenancy in common and
cannot agree to a partition, however, one of the partners must sue for partition
upon which the court awards ownership rights according to a party's
proportional ownership of the property.161 If the parties neither hold joint title
nor have an existing lease agreement for the property, a non-owner partner is

likely a month-to-month tenant.1 62 To evict a partner in a month-to-month
tenancy, the owner partner must simply give thirty-days' written notice.1 63
V.

AVAILABLE DOCTRINAL EXCEPTIONS

It is apparent the abolishment of common law marriage adversely affects
a large subset of individuals either who wish to enjoy the benefits of marriage
without the formality of traditional marriage requirements or who cannot
enjoy such benefits because of some tragedy depriving them of the ability to
marry. Perhaps most disadvantaged by the abolishment, however, are
individuals who believe themselves to be parties to a formal marriage but
nevertheless have an impediment rendering their marriage null and void. After
Stone, these couples no longer have a default alternative to guarantee legal
recognition of their marriage. While the Stone court unmistakably established
its distaste for common law marriage as an independent doctrine of marital

158. Id.
159. W.T. Geddings, Jr., PartitionActions in South Carolina,27 S.C. LAW., Mar. 2016, at
18, 20. See generally S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-61-10(A) (2005 & Supp. 2019) ("All joint tenants
and tenants in common who hold, jointly or in common, for a term of life or years or of whom
one has an estate for a term of life or years with the other that has an estate of inheritance or
freehold in any lands, tenements or hereditaments shall be compellable to make severance and
partition of all such lands, tenements, and hereditaments.").
160. See Paul W. Dillingham & Claire T. Manning, To Fee or Not to Fee, 18 S.C. LAW.,
Mar. 2007, at 37, 39-48.
161. Geddings, supra note 159, at 20.
162. S.C. CODE ANN. § 27-35-30 (2007).
163. Id. § 27-35-120.
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benefits,164 it did not expressly contemplate the effects of its decision on
couples with a good faith belief in the validity of their marriage. The South
Carolina Supreme Court will inevitably encounter future litigation involving
such issues, and as a result, fairness and equity demand an exception in these
cases.
A.

The Good Faith Exception

In 2015, the South Carolina Court of Appeals in Thomas v. 5 Star

Transportation explicitly declared a third type of marriage, separate from
formal and common law marriage, known as a marriage formed through the
good faith exception.1 65 Under Thomas, the court held:

[I]f a man and woman enter into a contract of marriage believing
in good faith that they are capable of entering into the relation
notwithstanding a former marriage, when, in fact, the marriage is still
of force, and after the removal of the obstacle of the former marriage
the parties continue the relation and hold themselves out as man and
wife, such action constitutes them man and wife from the date of the
removal of the obstacle.1 66

South Carolina is the only state to recognize this exception, and unlike
state precedent regarding both formal and common law marriage, the good
faith exception is severely underdeveloped. The exception has applied in
merely four cases-Davis v. Whitlock in 1911 and Bannister v. Bannister in
1929 (both South Carolina Supreme Court cases), and Weathers v. Bolt in
1987 and Thomas v. 5 Star Transportationin 2015 (both South Carolina Court

164. See Stone v. Thompson, 428 S.C. 79, 86, 833 S.E.2d 266, 270 (2019) ("Our public
policy is to promote predictable, just outcomes for all parties involved in [common law
marriage] disputes, as well as to emphasize the sanctity of the marital union. We can discern no
more efficacious way to fulfill these interests than to require those who wish to be married in
our State to comply with our statutory requirements. Our quest to see inside the minds of litigants
asserting different motivations and levels of knowledge at varying times must yield to the most
reliable measurement of marital intent: a valid marriage certificate.").
165. See Thomas v. 5 Star Transp., 412 S.C. 1, 16-18, 770 S.E.2d 183, 191-92 (Ct. App.
2015).
166. Id. at 16, 77 S.E.2d at 191 (quoting Davis v. Whitlock, 90 S.C. 233, 246, 73 S.E. 171,
175 (1911)).
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of Appeals cases).16 7 Of these cases, Davis and Thomas were the only cases
to find a valid marriage under the good faith exception.1 68
In Davis, the defendant's first husband abandoned her in 1868, and she
married the plaintiff in 1887.169 At the time of her marriage to the plaintiff,
the defendant admitted "she did not know whether [her first husband] was
dead or alive, and that she made no inquiry about it, and that she did not tell
[the] plaintiff of her prior marriages." 7 0 In 1901, the defendant learned that
her first husband died in 1895, seven years after her marriage to the
plaintiff. '7 Despite this news, the defendant continued her relationship with
the plaintiff until their separation in 1907.172 The Davis court held that the
parties were legally married as of 1895 because of the good faith exception.7 3
Although Davis makes no direct mention of common law marriage, an

initial decision by the trial court found the plaintiff could not invalidate his
marriage with the defendant because the couple "lived together as man and
wife and recognized each other as such for more than 10 years after the death
of [the plaintiff's first husband], which removed the only impediment to a
valid marriage .... "1?4 Based upon these findings, the Davis court held there
was "sufficient [evidence] to establish a common-law marriage."1?5
Considering the context of the Davis decision, it seems that the good faith
exception is a remedy completely dependent on the recognition of common
law marriage. Thomas, however, undermines this conclusion by finding a

marriage through the good faith exception and expressly declining to
recognize a common law marriage.17 6

The Davis court cited five cases in support of the good faith exception.17 7
Upon further evaluation, three of those cases used the good faith exception to
find a common law marriage. 7 8 Another one of those cases did not expressly
167. Davis, 90 S.C. at 246, 73 S.E. at 171; Bannister v. Bannister, 150 S.C. 411, 414, 148
S.E. 228, 229 (1929); Weathers v. Bolt, 293 S.C. 486, 489, 361 S.E.2d 773, 774 (Ct. App. 1987);
Thomas, 412 S.C. at 1, 770 S.E.2d at 183.
168. Davis, 90 S.C. at 248-49, 73 S.E. at 176; Thomas, 412 S.C. at 17-18, 770 S.E.2d at
192.
169. Davis, 90 S.C. at 243, 73 S.E. at 174.
170. Id. at 235-36, 73 S.E. at 172.
171. Id. at 235, 73 S.E. at 172.
172. Id. at 235, 73 S.E. at 171.
173. Id. at 248-49, 73 S.E. at 176.
174. Id. at 236, 73 S.E. at 172.
175. Id.
176. Thomas, 412 S.C. at 18, 770 S.E.2d at 192 ("Although the Appellate Panel erred in
determining [Wife] was [Husband's] common law or putative spouse, we affirm that [Wife] was
[Husband's] surviving spouse because they entered into marriage with a good faith belief that
they could marry and continued to act as husband and wife once the impediment was removed.").
177. Davis, 90 S.C. at 246, 73 S.E. at 175 (citations omitted).
178. See Adgerv. Ackerman, 115 F. 124, 133 (8th Cir. 1902); Landv. Land, 68 N.E. 1109,
1112 (Ill. 1903); Fenton v. Reed, 4 Johns. 52, 53-54 (N.Y. 1809).
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state a finding of common law marriage; rather, it cited other cases indicating
the basis of its decision was the common law marriage doctrine. 7 9 In the only
remaining cited case, Chamberlainv. Chamberlain,the court applied the good
faith exception as a remedy exclusive of common law marriage, 80
Chamberlaindid not identify its doctrine with terms such as "good faith" or

"exception," and the opinion is extremely short with not much substantive
value. The closest the Chamberlaincourt comes to announcing a rule is, "In
connection with the intent of both parties as admitted by them, we have
evidence to show that they manifested that intent to others after the divorce in
such a way as to fully establish the legality of their relationship."' 8' Thus,
despite its reliance on precedent that seemingly equates marriage via good
faith exception with a common law marriage, Thomas is the only prominent

case declaring a marriage formed by the good faith exception outside of the
context of common law marriage.18 2

Assuming the Thomas approach is correct such that common law
marriage and the good faith exception are mutually exclusive, Thomas' rule
is still applicable in South Carolina, notwithstanding Stone. There are notable
concerns with the good faith exception, however. First, prior cases have been
limited to those where the impediment at issue is bigamy.1 83 This leaves open
the possibility that a court can refuse to apply the good faith exception in cases
of procedural issues, for example. Even if equity seems to demand a remedy
for couples with technical errors on marriage licenses, invalid authorization
of marriage licenses, and insufficient satisfaction of the waiting period, the
Thomas rule, if applied verbatim, would not protect such couples. To
adequately apply the good faith exception in these cases, the South Carolina
Supreme Court must broaden the doctrine to apply in cases of all
impediments, including those of a procedural nature.
Moreover, the court should not require removal of the impediment to
ratify an otherwise void marriage because, in cases of procedural defect, the
impediment often cannot be removed. For instance, when a party lacking the
requisite statutory authority, such as a Buddhist priest, attempts to validate a

179. Eaton v. Eaton, 92 N.W. 995, 998 (Neb. 1902) (first citing Blanchard v. Lambert, 43
Iowa 228, 231 (Iowa 1876)); then citing Univ. of Mich. v. McGuckin, 89 N.W. 778, 779 (Neb.
1902); and then citing Fenton, 4 Johns. at 52).
180. Chamberlain v. Chamberlain, 62 A. 680, 681 (N.J. 1905) ("This evidence was a
manifestation of an intent to live together as husband and wife, and with the intention and the
actual so living an actual marriage is established.").
181. Id. at 680-81.
182. Thomas v. 5 Star Transp., 412 S.C. 1, 17-18, 770 S.E.2d 183, 192 (Ct. App. 2015).
183. See Davis v. Whitlock, 90 S.C. 233, 233, 73 S.E. 171, 171 (1911); Thomas, 412 S.C.
at 1, 770 S.E.2d at 183; Weathers v. Bolt, 293 S.C. 486, 486, 361 S.E.2d 773, 773 (Ct. App.
1987).
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couple's marriage,184 yet the couple does not realize this invalidity, it is
unlikely the couple will discover the impediment until a divorce or some other
tragedy. Once again, applying the rule verbatim in this instance would not
protect such individuals because, by its very nature, a marriage formed by the
good faith exception requires removal of a marital obstacle and continued
cohabitation thereafter. Because couples generally will not discover
procedural impediments until it is too late, a more comprehensive and
inclusive rule is needed whereby good faith belief in the validity of a
marriage-despite the presence of an impediment-can ratify the marriage
upon continuous marital cohabitation.
Another area in which South Carolina case law requires further
development involves the definitional standard of good faith. Assuming South
Carolina will apply the definition of good faith that other states have used, 85
the courts will encounter a directional challenge of whether the analysis of
good faith encompasses purely subjective considerations or both objective and
subjective considerations.1 8 6 A purely subjective approach determines
whether the proponent of the marriage indeed had a belief in the validity of
the marriage, considering the specific facts of the case. 87 On the contrary, an
objective-subjective approach considers whether a reasonable person in the
proponent's shoes would believe a valid marriage existed.1 88 When
considering the approaches for determining good faith, a purely subjective
approach not only would be difficult for an opposing spouse to disprove but
also would result in a larger volume of marriages due to one-sided claims of
184. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-1-20 (2014) ("Only ministers of the Gospel, Jewish rabbis,
officers authorized to administer oaths in this State, and the chief or spiritual leaders of a Native
American Indian entity recognized by the South Carolina Commission for Minority
Affairs . . are authorized to administer a marriage ceremony in this State.").
185. See infra note 194 and accompanying text.
186. See infra note 195 and accompanying text; infra note 196 and accompanying text.
187. Ceja v. Rudolph & Sletten, Inc., 302 P.3d 211, 213 (Cal. 2013) ("We conclude [the
putative spouse statute] contemplates a subjective standard that focuses on the alleged putative
spouse's state of mind to determine whether he or she maintained a genuine and honest belief in
the validity of the marriage. Good faith must be judged on a case-by-case basis in light of all the
relevant facts, . . . including any objective evidence of the marriage's invalidity. Under this
standard, the reasonableness of the claimed belief is a factor properly considered along with all
other circumstances in assessing the genuineness of that belief. The good faith inquiry, however,
does not call for application of a reasonable person test, and a belief in the validity of a marriage
need not be objectively reasonable."); Xiong v. Xiong, 800 N.W.2d 187, 191 (Minn. Ct. App.
2011) ("We reject [an argument that good faith is tested by an objective standard] because in
Minnesota, 'good faith' is judged subjectively, while 'reasonable belief' is judged objectively."
(quoting Bahr v. Capella Univ., 778 N.W.2d 76, 82 (Minn. 2010))).
188. In re Marriage of Vryonis, 248 Cal. Rptr. 807, 812 (Cal. Ct. App. 1988) ("While a
trial court may be tempted to base a finding of putative spousal status merely on the subjective
good faith in a valid marriage held by a credible and sympathetic party, more is required. 'Good
faith belief' is a legal term of art, and in both the civil and criminal law a determination of good
faith is tested by an objective standard."), overruledby Ceja, 302 P. 3d at 221 n.12.
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marriage validity. To ensure that such marriages are obtained in only the most
equitable circumstances, the objective-subjective approach is better suited for
South Carolina. Under this approach, the court can consider the totality of the
circumstances, including the proponent's knowledge, intelligence, education,
and age while also remaining grounded in the standard of a reasonable person.
This ensures a fair consideration of the proponent's belief while also
balancing societal perceptions of marriage validity. Regardless of any
decision in this capacity, it is undeniable the good faith exception will require
supplementary development to be a fully functioning, autonomous doctrine.
B.

Putative Spouse Doctrine

Another potential solution for equity in the case of procedural defect is
the putative spouse doctrine. According to the Uniform Marriage and Divorce
Act, a putative spouse is "[a]ny person who has cohabited with another to
whom he is not legally married in the good faith belief that he was married to
that person."1 89 To qualify for protection under the putative spouse doctrine,

putative spouses cannot have any awareness of the invalid status of their
marriage.1 90 Once an individual qualifies as a putative spouse, the doctrine
allows the party to enjoy the benefits of a valid marriage despite effective
invalidity.191 Upon discovery of the invalid nature of the marriage, however,
the protection of the putative spouse doctrine ceases to exist, and a couple
must comply with the statutory requirements of marriage to enjoy marital

benefits thereafter.1 92
There are two general elements required for putative spouse doctrine to
apply: "(1) a proper ceremony [must have been] performed, and (2) one or

both parties [must have had] a good-faith belief that there was no impediment

189. UNIF. MARRIAGE & DIVORCE ACT § 209 (1973).

190. Id.
191. Christopher L. Blakesley, The Putative Marriage Doctrine, 60 TUL. L. REV. 1, 7
(1985). The precise benefits of a putative marriage vary depending on the state. Uniformly,
putative spouse doctrine applies to division of property. See, e.g., Union Bank & Trust Co. v.
Gordon, 254 P.2d 644, 649 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1953) ("[O]n dissolution of aputative marriage[,]
the property which the de facto spouses have acquired as a result of their joint efforts is to be
treated as though it was the accumulation of a valid marriage."). However, application of the
doctrine to spousal support is more ambiguous. Some states, like Nevada and California, do not
apply the doctrine to awards of alimony unless fraud is involved. Sanguinetti v. Sanguinetti, 69
P.2d 845, 847 (Cal. 1937) (citations omitted); Williams v. Williams, 97 P.3d 1124, 1126 (Nev.
2004). On the contrary, other states, including Colorado, Illinois, Minnesota, and Montana,
allow a putative spouse to receive alimony. See 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/305 (West, Westlaw
through P.A. 101-628); MINN. STAT. § 518.055 (West, Westlaw through Jan. 1, 2020 Leg.);
MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-1-404 (West, Westlaw through 2019 Sess.).
192. Blakesley, supra note 191, at 22.
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to the marriage and the marriage was valid and proper."' 93 Establishing the
first element is fairly straightforward. The second element, however, is often
disputed. State courts applying this doctrine have defined good faith as an
"honest and reasonable belief that the marriage was valid at the time of the
ceremony." 194 While some states measure reasonable belief using both
objective and subjective considerations,1 95 other states measure reasonable
belief subjectively, considering only the individual's state of mind relative to
the circumstances.1 96 When the couple held a wedding ceremony, courts
presume good faith such that any party asserting lack of good faith has the
burden of proving bad faith.1 97 To rebut this presumption, asserting parties

must show that their partner had reliable information demonstrating the
invalid nature of the marriage yet failed to fulfill the duty to investigate with
reasonable precaution.1 98 Regarding the reliability of information,
"unconfirmed rumors or mere suspicions of a legal impediment do not vitiate
knowledge of some legal
good faith, 'so long as no certain or authoritative
99
impediment comes to [the claiming party]."'1

Ultimately, the primary purpose of the putative spouse doctrine is to
"avoid depriving innocent parties who believe in good faith that they are
married from being denied the economic and status-related benefits of
marriage, such as property division, pension, and health benefits." 20 0
193. Williams, 97 P.3d at 1128.
194. Hicklin v. Hicklin, 509 N.W.2d 627, 628 (Neb. 1994) (first citing Funderburk v.
Funderburk, 38 So. 2d 502, 504 (La. 1949); and then citing Mara v. Mara, 452 So. 2d 329, 332
(La. Ct. App. 1984)). See also Alfonso v. Alfonso, 739 So. 2d 946, 948 (La. Ct. App. 1999)
("'Good faith' is defined as an honest and reasonable belief that the marriage was valid and that
no legal impediment to it existed.") (quoting Saacks v. Saacks, 688 So. 2d 673, 676 (La. Ct.
App. 1997)).
195. In re Marriage of Vryonis, 248 Cal. Rptr. 807, 812 (Cal. Ct. App. 1988) ("While a
trial court may be tempted to base a finding of putative spousal status merely on the subjective
good faith in a valid marriage held by a credible and sympathetic party, more is required. 'Good
faith belief' is a legal term of art, and in both the civil and criminal law a determination of good
faith is tested by an objective standard."), overruled by Ceja v. Rudolph & Sletten, Inc., 302
P.3d 211, 221 n.12 (Cal. 2013).
196. Ceja, 302 P.3d at 213 ("We conclude .... [t]he good faith inquiry, however, does not
call for application of a reasonable person test, and a belief in the validity of a marriage need not
be objectively reasonable."); Xiongv. Xiong, 800 N.W.2d 187, 191 (Minn. Ct. App. 2011) ("We
reject [an argument that good faith is tested by an objective standard] because in Minnesota,
'good faith' is judged subjectively .... ").
197. Hicklin, 509 N.W.2d at 631-32 (first quoting Funderburk, 38 So. 2d at 504; and then
quoting Mara, 452 So. 2d at 332).
198. See Williams, 97 P.3d at 1128 (citing Garduno v. Garduno, 760 S.W.2d 735, 740 (Tex.
Ct. App. 1988)). Specifically, "a party alleging good faith can not [sic] close her eyes to
information or her ears to suspicious circumstances. She must not act blindly or without
reasonable precaution." Succession of Chavis, 29 So. 2d 860, 863 (La. 1957).
199. Williams, 97 P.3d at 1128 (citing Garduno v. Garduno, 760 S.W.2d at 740).
200. Id. (citing Cortes v. Fleming, 307 So. 2d 611, 613 (La. 1973)).
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Although aspects of the putative spouse doctrine resemble common law
marriage, the doctrines are mutually exclusive and rather dissimilar in
application. Unlike the doctrine of common law marriage, an element of the
putative spouse doctrine requires that "the parties .

.

. actually attempted to

enter into a formal [and statutorily-based] relationship with the solemnization
of a marriage ceremony." 20 ' Even if a state has abolished common law
marriage out of concern for the inviolability of formal marriage, subsequent
adoption of the putative spouse doctrine does not undercut such a decision.
Rather, "[a]s a majority of [the adopting] states have recognized, the sanctity
of marriage is not undermined, but rather enhanced, by the recognition of the
putative spouse doctrine."

20 2

Although the South Carolina Supreme Court has expressly "declined to
adopt the putative spouse doctrine 'as it is contrary to South Carolina's
statutory law and marital jurisprudence,"' 20

3

other states have adopted-both

legislatively and judicially-the doctrine or an analogue thereof in the wake
of common law marriage abolishment. 204 Since other states have adopted the
putative spouse doctrine as a solution for the inequities following a common
law marriage abolishment, the doctrine is ripe for revisiting after Stone. Due
to the pragmatics of the good faith exception, however, its recognition is an
enhanced alternative compared to the putative spouse doctrine for two
primary reasons. First, unlike the putative spouse doctrine, the good faith
exception does not terminate upon discovery of an impediment, 205 and second,
the good faith exception does not expressly require a ceremony. 206 Thus,
201. Id.
202. Id.
203. Hill v. Bell, 405 S.C. 423, 426, 747 S.E.2d 791, 792-93 (2013).
204. See, e.g., Velez v. Smith, 48 Cal. Rptr. 3d 642, 656 (Cal. Ct. App. 2006) ("Under the
putative spouse doctrine, 'Where a marriageis invalid due to some legal infirmity, an innocent
party may be entitled to relief under the putative spouse doctrine."' (emphasis added) (quoting
Estate of DePasse, 118 Cal. Rptr. 2d 143, 155 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002))); Fonoti v. Fonoti, A170091, 2018 WL 2187358, at *1 (Minn. Ct. App. May 14, 2018) ("[W]hen a person in a
cohabiting relationship mistakenly, but in good faith, believes that he or she is married, the
putative-spouse statute may apply."); Williams, 97 P.3d at 1128 ("Under the putative spouse
doctrine, when a marriage is legally void, the civil effects of a legal marriage flow to the parties
who contracted to marry in good faith."); Buckley v. Buckley, 96 P. 1079, 1081 (Wash 1908)
("Where a woman in good faith enters into a marriage contract with a man, and they assume and
enter into the marriage state pursuant to any ceremony or agreement . . which marriage would
be legal except for the incompetency of the man which he conceals from the woman, a status is
created which will justify a court . .. [assumption of] marriage contract upon complaint of the
innocent party .... ").
205. Weathers v. Bolt, 293 S.C. 486, 489, 361 S.E.2d 773, 774 (Ct. App. 1987) ("[I]f the
parties enter into a contract of marriage believing in 'good faith' that they are capable of
marrying and after the removal of all impediments[,] they continue the relationship, they are
considered man and wife from the date they became free to marry.").
206. See Thomas v. 5 Star Transp., 412 S.C. 1, 15-17, 770 S.E.2d 183, 191 (Ct. App.
2015).
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despite the court's aversion for the putative spouse doctrine, the good faith
exception, although underdeveloped, will inevitably provide a superior
remedy for South Carolina couples.
C.

Palimony

The landmark case of Marvin v. Marvin20 7 brought copious attention to

the California Supreme Court due to its novel creation of an independent
remedy for the cohabitants who did not enter into an express contract.
Specifically, the court noted that the parties' conduct "demonstrate[d] an
implied contract or implied agreement of partnership or joint venture, or some
other tacit understanding between the parties." 208 Scholars later acknowledged
this remedy as "palimony," 20 9 upon which "the formation of a marital-type
relationship between unmarried persons may, legitimately and enforceably,
rest upon a promise by one to support the other." 210 According to palimony
cases, consideration in the implied contract is simply participation in a unique

cohabitating relationship-each party forms an informal union of cohabitation
that demonstrates the parties' intent to share in collective financial efforts,
property, and assets. 211

Palimony is distinctive in that, unlike the putative spouse doctrine and the
good faith exception, a court does not require intent to be married at any
point.212 Rather, the parties can intend merely to be cohabitants whereby the
nature of their relationship suggests a joint, quasi-marital effort that does not
"rest upon illicit meretricious consideration." 213 In Marvin, the couple in fact
had an express agreement. 214 However, recognizing the inequities that would

arise from identical circumstances where a couple did not have an express
contract, the California Supreme Court decided to create an independent

recovery doctrine. 2 15 The Marvin court's primary policy consideration was
207. Marvin v. Marvin, 557 P.2d 106, 121 (Cal. 1976).
208. Id. at 122.
209. See STUCKEY, supra note 19, at 57.
210. In re Estate of Roccamonte, 808 A.2d 838, 844 (N.J. 2002).
211. See id. at 844-45 ("Whatever other consideration may be involved, the entry into such
a relationship and then conducting oneself in accordance with its unique character is
consideration in full measure.").
212. See Marvin, 557 P.2d at 121 ("[A]lthough parties to a nonmarital relationship
obviously cannot have based any expectations upon the belief that they were married, other
expectations and equitable considerations remain.").
213. Id. at 116.
214. Id. at 110.
215. See id. at 118 ("[Prior case law] exhibit[s] a schizophrenic inconsistency. By
enforcing an express contract between nonmarital partners unless it rested upon an unlawful
consideration, the courts applied a common law principle as to contracts. Yet the courts
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that "adults who voluntarily live together and engage in sexual relations are
nonetheless as competent as any other persons to contract respecting their

earnings and property rights." 216 Although an undoubtedly unique benefit to
cohabiting couples, the adoption of palimony as an independent remedy is
rare. In fact, since Marvin, one state has adopted palimony as a common law
doctrine, only to be later overturned by its legislature. 217
South Carolina has never awarded palimony to a cohabitating couple, so
the determination remains open in the wake of the abolishment of common
law marriage. However, due to South Carolina's general aversion to adopting
a rarely implemented doctrine, the state will likely not adopt the remedy of
palimony. In South Carolina, the only comparatively relevant case to Marvin
is the 1941 case of Grant v. Butt.218 In Grant, the South Carolina Supreme

Court declined to enforce a cohabitation agreement where an unmarried
woman agreed to cohabitate with an unmarried man in exchange for his
making her a beneficiary of his life insurance policy. 219 Although Grantdoes
provide a rough guide approximating South Carolina's judicial reaction to
cases of implied contracts for palimony, 220 the era in which Grantwas decided
lends much credence to the argument that gender influences, meretricious
consideration, and a general revulsion against cohabitation were primary
concerns of the court.
There is a prominent benefit to the recognition of palimony as compared
to the good faith exception, however. Whereas the good faith exception
protects otherwise invalid marriages, the remedy of palimony acknowledges
that cohabitation is not inherently marital and offers a completely neutral

disregarded the common law principle that holds that implied contracts can arise from the
conduct of the parties.").
216. Id. at 116.
217. Kozlowski v. Kozlowski, 403 A.2d 902, 906-07 (N.J. 1979) ("Whether we designate
the agreement reached by the parties . . . to be express, as we do here, or implied is of no legal
consequence.... We conclude that the judicial barriers that may stand in the way of a policy
based upon the fulfillment of the reasonable expectations of the parties to a nonmarital
relationship should be removed."). Kozlowski was superseded in 2010 by statute. See N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 25:1-5 (West 2009 throughL.2019, c. 303 and J.R. No. 22) ("No action shall be brought
upon any of the following agreements or promises, unless the agreement or promise . . . shall be
in writing, and signed by the party to be charged therewith .... A promise by one party to a
non-marital personal relationship to provide support or other consideration for the other party,
either during the course of such relationship or after its termination.").
218. Grant v. Butt, 198 S.C. 298, 17 S.E.2d 689 (1941).
219. See id. at 298, 17 S.E.2d at 690, 694.
220. See id at 304, 17 S.E.2d at 692 ("This contract strikes at the sanctity of the home, the
security of family relationships,... and at moral standards that have been recognized and
enforced, voluntarily and by compulsion of law, since the foundation of this republic.").
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remedy independent of marriage. 221 Because the Stone court expressed its
primary concern for the uniformity and predictability of marriage itself, the
court may be less reluctant to adopt a remedy of palimony because it
recognizes that cohabitation and marriage are mutually exclusive and not
synonymous.222

Rather than being fixated on the existence of marriage, palimony is
concerned with equity. Determining the equitable solution in a case of
cohabitation is far less complex than untangling intent in a case of possible
common law marriage. If the South Carolina Supreme Court decided to adopt
palimony, a trial court would dedicate its analysis simply to ascertaining
whether two individuals cohabitated in such a manner that terminating their
relationship would create turmoil. If so, palimony may be appropriate, and if
not, palimony is not appropriate. Nonetheless, if faced with the rare
recognition of palimony as compared to the already-recognized good faith
exception, South Carolina will likely reject the former in preference for the
latter.
VI. CONCLUSION
The South Carolina Supreme Court's decision in Stone v. Thompson will

inevitably mark South Carolina history as one of the most revolutionary
departures from this state's long-standing doctrine of common law marriage.
The considerations of paternalistic underpinnings, albeit valid, are highly
overstated in the court's opinion. Although originally developed solely as a
remedy for dependent women, the purpose of common law marriage has
shifted. No longer is the benefit of this type of marriage solely conditioned on
the dependency of a woman. Rather, under the modern doctrine of common
law marriage, both men and women equally obtain marital benefits in cases
of divorce or tragedy where it may be too late to obtain a formal marriage.
As it stands, our country, particularly in its southern states where
informality often constitutes normative social mores, is at a crossroad in
determining marital rights, freedoms, and responsibilities. There is no doubt
the past decade has ushered in radical deviations from historical perceptions
221. See In re Estate of Roccamonte, 808 A.2d 838, 844 (N.J. 2002) ("A marital-type
relationship is no more exclusively dependent upon one partner's providing maid service than it
is upon sexual accommodation. It is, rather, the undertaking of a way of life in which two people
commit to each other, foregoing other liaisons and opportunities, doing for each other whatever
each is capable of doing, providing companionship, and fulfilling each other's needs, financial,
emotional, physical, and social, as best as they are capable. And each couple defines its way of
life and each partner's expected contribution to it in its own way.").
222. Marvin v. Marvin, 557 P.2d 106, 121 (Cal. 1976) ("But, although parties to a
nonmarital relationship obviously cannot have based any expectations upon the belief that they
were married, other expectations and equitable considerations remain.").
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of marriage. Within this modern trend is an acceptance of the implied freedom
to conduct private, intimate relationships in forums with equal recognition, 223
regardless of race, sex, religious belief, or formality. Masked in the traditional
notions of marriage formality, the punitive effects of Stone signify a vast
deviation from the current trend-one that is not only unwarranted but also
unjust.

Despite a conceded salutation to the legislature's power over the doctrine,
the Stone court expressly denied legislative authority and single-handedly
overhauled arguably the most profound common law institution in South

Carolina. In order to effectuate an optimal result for those currently faced with
an indeterminate defense against the abolishment of common law marriage,
the South Carolina Supreme Court should expressly adopt and necessarily
expound upon the good faith exception of Thomas v. 5 Star Transportation.224

Notwithstanding the court's approach to a self-identified regulatory power,
the demands of justice, equity, and integrity will eventually mandate a
responsive exception to the harsh implications of Stone.

223. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 567 (2003) ("It suffices for us to acknowledge
that adults may choose to enter upon [sexual] relationship[s] in the confines of their homes and
their own private lives and still retain their dignity as free persons."). See generally Obergefell
v. Hodges, 576 U.S. 644, 646 (2015) ("[T]he right to personal choice regarding marriage is
inherent in the concept of individual autonomy.").
224. Thomas v. 5 Star Transp., 412 S.C. 1, 770 S.E.2d 183 (Ct. App. 2015).
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